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Abstract 
The literature dedicated to the analysis of the different climate agreements has usually 
focused on the effectiveness of the aims for emissions in the light of the advance in climate 
change. This article quantifies the variation in emissions that the Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) will entail and their financial allocation and policies 
country-by-country and regionally. The objective is evaluating the Paris Agreement feasibility 
regarding the INDCs and, economic and environmental constraints. The criteria through which 
the 161 INDCs are analysed are as follows: i/ socio-economic impact of the transition; ii/ focus 
on energy management; iii/ substitution of non-renewable sources; iv/ the role of technology; v/ 
equality of the transition; vi/ compliance with emission reductions. The results obtained show 
that the Paris Agreement excessively relies on external financial support (41.4%). Moreover, its 
unilateralist approach, the socio-economic and biophysical constraints could be the underlying 
cause of the ineffectiveness of the 2ºC objective. This way, each country would emit an average 
of 37.8% more than in the years 2005-2015. When this is weighted, the figure would be a 19.3% 
increase, due mainly to the increases in China and India. These figures would lead the 
temperatures up to 3º-4ºC.  
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1. Introduction.  
 
The consequences of climate change induced by human activity are a growing concern 
for the international community (IPCC, 2014; UNEP, 2011; Melillo et al., 2014). Evident 
effects such as extreme meteorological phenomena, rising temperatures and rising sea levels 
show the rapid climatic adaptation of natural ecosystems. The rapid increase in these impacts 
and the fact that abrupt changes could arise leads to the conclusion that the cost of transferring 
the responsibility for putting it right to the coming generations becomes ever higher. In this 
sense, the IPCC (2014) has warned that if, by 2050, we have not managed to reduce the level of 
emissions with respect to 2010 by between 25% and 72%, then maintaining the rise in world 
temperatures to below 2oC with respect to preindustrial levels will be “more improbable than 
probable”. Besides the most visible consequences today, if the temperatures rose by more than 
3oC-4oC, humanity would face a scenario of massive extinction of species, entailing risks for 
human health and severe restrictions on access to food and water, so vital for survival (IPCC, 
2014). Achieving this goal involves phasing out fossil fuels whereby around 82% of the current 
reserves of coal, 49% of natural gas reserves and 33% of the oil reserves should remain 
underground in order to avoid an increase in temperatures of more than 2oC (McGlade & Ekins, 
2015). 
Regarding these concerns, in December 2015, the 21st Conference of Parties (COP21) 
was celebrated, made up of 188 countries, and whose most important result was the Paris 
Agreement (UN, 2015) and the collection of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions 
(INDCs) submitted by each of the participating countries.  After de burial of the Kyoto Protocol, 
the current agreement is an unilateral vision in which the players establish their own voluntary 
objectives (Spash, 2015) through the INDCs. Although the agreement indicates that the main 
priority is to “hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2oC above pre-
industrial levels”, during the COP21, the participants were sufficiently optimistic as to speak 
openly of 1.5oC. Not only this, but in spite of the fact that they incorporated such equality 
criteria as the obligation of the Developed Countries (DC) to a greater reduction in emissions 
and the channelling of financial resources to the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the COP21 
succeeded in involving some countries with medium incomes in these differentiated efforts 
(Viola, 2016). 
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In response to global concerns of these issues, a widening literature on sustainability 
transitions has emerged in recent years (Markaard, Raven, and Truffer 2012). Literature on 
climate summits mostly evaluates whether they comply with emissions limits or not (den Elzen 
et al., 2011; UNEP, 2010; Kartha & Eriksson, 2011; Höhne et al., 2012). Considering COP21 
and the Paris Agreement (2015), main contributions are related to its impacts in energy 
technologies evolution (Peters 2017; Lacal Arantegui and Jäger-Waldau 2017) or evaluate 
possible transition pathways under its contexts in different regions (Liobikienė and Butkus 
2017; Van de Graaf 2017; Gao 2016). Some works, conversely, points out difficulties to 
accomplish the COP21 objectives according to geopolitical and governance limits from a 
general perspective of the Paris Agreement (Spash, 2015; Viola, 2016). Moreover, an increasing 
number of governments, municipalities and NGOs are creating its own low carbon transitions 
plans plans according to their own criteria, or those established in the aforementioned climate 
summits.  Thus, on the basis of Wiseman et al. (2013), Nieto & Carpintero (2016) deal with a 
more in-depth analysis of 19 low-carbon transition plans from government sources and other 
dependent agencies, NGOs and research centres.  
In this article, Paris Agreement is evaluated on the light of biophysical, technological 
and economic limits, throughout a systematic analysis of each of the 161 INDCs submitted by 
the 188 countries in COP21.      
Thus, the aim of this article is to put these INDCs under the same microscope that 
analyzed some previous plans (Nieto & Carpintero, 2016), situating the focus on the socio-
economic impacts, international equality, technology, energy and emissions. This analysis will 
allow us to evaluate the feasability of the Paris Agreement policies in complying with its own 
objectives through the national commitments (INDCs). In the same way, we will evaluate the 
main limitations of the imposed governance and finance framework. In order to achieve these 
aims, a systematic analysis of the policies, the emission reduction commitments and the funding 
needs for implanting INDCs has been carried out. 
The article is structured as follows: Section two describes the methodological process 
used to give homogeneity to the data offered by the INDCs. Section three sets out the main 
results of the exhaustive analysis of these INDCs. Section four  confronts the results extracted 
from INDCs with the biophysical restrictions and the literature. Finally, Section five 
summarizes the article’s main conclusions. 
2. Methodology. 
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The flexibility of the Paris Agreement has led to a lack of systematic presentation of the 
INDCs. Therefore, this paper proposes a methology to homogenize data and categorize the 
information. For more detailed information, consult Annex A, as well as the repository of 
INDCs1. We have examined a total of 161 INDCs representing 188 countries that account for 
97.8% of the world’s emissions. 
In order to achieve the aims of this article, we have paid special attention to the policies 
of mitigation as opposed to those of adaptation because of their economic (Buchner et al., 2015) 
and environmental importance. We have noted (as far as possible) the data concerning the 
objectives for reducing sectoral and global emissions, the policies for achieving the said 
objectives and their funding, with the greatest possible breakdown. We have also studied the 
proposed financial mechanisms and the nature of the agents who would lead the transition. We 
have grouped the different countries with respect to their level of income in accordance with the 
World Bank’s (WB) classification, establishing a distinct group for the 12 most contaminating 
countries on the planet (Top 12) in 2014 (72.2% of the total emissions) because of their 
relevance for climate policies.  
With reference to emissions, the INDCs have both unconditional and conditional 
objectives. The former would be carried out exclusively with domestic resources, while the 
latter would be conditional on receiving outside assistance. In general, the INDCs presented 
some problems that made the analysis more difficult; such as the discrepancies between the year 
of reference and that of the horizon. To resolve this issue, we have discarded those INDCs that 
do not have the year 2030 as their time horizon or the reference year outside the range 2005-
2015. This reference year has been chosen because of two reasons. Firstly, EU used 2005 as one 
of the reference years (along with 1990 and 2030) in its Communication titled "A roadmap for 
moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050". Secondly, most of the INDCs are within 
this time range, so it was reasonable to use it. Besides, a differential analysis has been carried 
out of the 12 most contaminating countries (Top12), for which we were able to establish a 
common reference year of 2005.  
On the other hand, the reduction objectives are presented in different ways:  
i/ As a partial and/or sectoral objective: for instance, a proportion of renewable sources 
in the energy mix or objectives that are merely relative to one sector of the economy. These 
have not been considered in the calculation of emissions reductions.  
                                                     
1 http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Submission%20Pages/submissions.aspx 
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 ii/ In GHG emissions intensity (CO2eq/GDP). To calculate the net variation in 
emissions, we proceed as set out in the methodological annex. 
 iii/ As emissions reductions with respect to a base year. The only countries obliged to 
do so are those in Annex I2 and, with some exceptions, the only ones who do so in this way. No 
additional calculation is needed beyond establishing the base range and/or horizon year.  
iv/ As emissions reductions with respect to a trend scenario (business as usual). This is 
the most common, used by all the countries not in Annex 1, except Brazil3. To calculate the 
variation in absolute terms with respect to the base range, we proceed as detailed in the 
methodological annex.   
Taking a conservative stance, we have considered that the trend and the real variation in 
emissions is the same for the Annex I countries, assuming that they will carry out all the 
promised policies and that they will, indeed, reach the appointed goals. In addition, we have 
calculated the weighted emissions with respect to each country’s contribution to global 
emissions in 2013, the last year for which reliable, homogeneous data exist through the 
Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR) of the European Commission.  
On the other hand, the necessary funding for each plan has been broken down into 
mitigation, adaptation and other expenses. The INDCs provide figures in dollars (without 
specifying any basis) to be expended from 2020 to 2030. Financial effort is measured as the 
share of financial funding allocated by the INDC over GDP (2010 constant dollars at market 
prices). External funding and its proportion over total funding has been evaluated as well. 
Similarly, we have obtained the amount of funding required per unit percent of emissions 
reduction. This information has been obtained directly from the data facilitated by the INDCs. 
When not provided, it has been made the assumption that the share of external funding equals 
the proportion of conditional emissions reduction over total emissions reduction. 
Finally, it has been summarized the main policies with respect to the different sectors of 
each country, as well as a summary table of the main policies to which each country is 
committed. The policies are broken down according to the Directives of the IPCC for the 
national inventories of greenhouse gases (1996). However, the breakdown of the energy sector 
has been used due to its strategic nature for some INDCs.  
                                                     
2 Industrialized countries that were members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development) in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition (the EIT Parties), 
including the Russian Federation, the Baltic States, and several Central and Eastern European States. 
3 Unless explicitly mentioned alternatively, when a particular country is mentioned, the reference 
is its INDC, which can be consulted in the UNFCC repository, as explained in footnote 1. 
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3. Towards a new landscape: the INDCs in detail. 
 
An exhaustive analysis of all the INDCs has been carried out with respect to four 
criteria: i/ the quality of the information provided; ii/ the proposed policies; iii/ the funding 
needed to carry them out and, finally; iv/ the estimated reduction in emissions. 
3.1. Quality of information 
 
The greatest difficulties involved in carrying out this research concerned the lack of 
homogeneity in the data. The INDCs come from different sources, the quantity and quality of 
the information is highly variable and even contains errors. The INDCs have been divided with 
respect to the quality of the general and funding information offered, according to the criteria of 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Information criteria 
General information Financial information
Medium Quality
Low or none emissions information 
and/or low or none policies 
Sufficient emissions information and/or 
sectoral disaggregated policies 
information.
No financial information.
Financial information in total amounts.
Low Quality
Good emissions information and highly 
deep disaggregated policies 
information.
Financial information disaggregated by 
area (mitigation/adaptation) and/or by 
policies/sectors.
High Quality
 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of the INDCs submitted to COP21. 
According to what can be seen in Table 7, the quality of the information follows a 
trajectory which is inversely proportional to the level of income of the country collecting the 
said information. Only 18.5% of the plans can be considered as offering general information of 
high quality, and only 12.7% as far as finance is concerned. In addition, only the plans from 
countries with medium-low and low incomes offer a higher than average quality in both 
categories.  
 
These correspond mostly to small island states and African countries. For the former, 
climate change supposes the greatest possible threat (being submerged under the sea), while the 
latter see in the Paris Agreement an opportunity for sustainable development aided externally. 
The low quality of financial information provided by the OECD countries does not provide any 
data at all about the funding of their policies (two thirds of the plans have been classified as of 
“low quality”). The lack of any common standards or adequate auditing of the information 
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received means that the objectives are difficult to compare or measure, which in turn makes any 
effective control over compliance almost impossible. 
3.2. Mitigation policies: energy, industry, agriculture, waste and LULUCF. 
 
The different policies under review in the INDCs respond to the following sectoral 
structure: i/ energy - electricity generation, transport and housing -; ii/ industrial processes; iii/ 
use of solvents and other products, iv/ agriculture, v/ change in land use and forestry (LULUCF) 
and, vi/ waste. Table 2 summarizes the principal policies by sectors and each one is assigned a 
code to facilitate understanding and clarity in the other summary tables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Overview of main policies in the INDCs 
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G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6
G7
G8
R1
R2
R3
R4
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
T8
T9
T10
I1
I2
I3
I4
I5
I6
I7
I8
I9
W1
W2
W3
W4
W5
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
L1
SECTOR SUBSECTOR POLICY ACTION CODE
Rural electrification. Substitute charcoal by electricity/Electrification
Process efficiency.
Best thermoelectric generation (coal and gas).
Combined cycle power stations. Switch to natural gas.
 Decentralization of energy Off and on-grid roof solar panels, solar thermal and 
Transition to renwable and 
cleaner technologies.
Renewable deployment: solar, wind, hydro.
RESIDENTIAL Consumption efficiency.
Enhanced technologies for heating and cooking 
Reconstruction, construction or improvement of 
Efficient technologies.
ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION
Best lighting technologies. 
Enhance buildings efficiency/solar thermal installation.
Social awarness.
Reduction Absolute reduction in energy consumption
Spatial and urban planning.
Improvement of road system.
Promotion of electric and hybrid vehicle.
Structural change.
Mass public transport.
Intermodality and switch to an efficient transport 
Fuels substitution.
Carbon tax (emissions).
Promotion and research on biofuels.
Measures oriented to industrial ecology.
Sectoral. Reduce emissions in cement industry.
Non motorized transport.
SECTOR POLICY ACTION
INDUSTRY
Process efficiency.
Improve the overall efficiency of industry.
Energy cogeneration.
TRANSPORT
Transport efficiency Encouraging acquisition of hybrid and efficient vehicles.
Discourage acquisition of inefficient vehicles.
ENERGY
WASTE
Circular economy and reduction.
Reduce, Reuse, Recycle. 
Transform waste to energy.
Structural change.
Modernization and switch to an enhanced value added 
Tertiarisation (China).
Emissions reduction. Carbon capture and storage and Carbon capture and use.
Sectoral.
Social awarness (minor support).
Management.
Improve landfill management,consctruct new ones and 
promotion of compost.
Extractive industry.
Reduce flaring and venting.
Improvements in processes, efficiency and distribution.
CODE
L2
LULUCF Extend vegetation cover. 
Avoid defforestation.
Afforestation and refforestation.
Reduce emissions of rice fields.
Others.
Control of fertilizers and pesticides.
Methan capture. 
Sanitation. Sanitation improvement in residential sector.
AGRICULTURE
Structural change.
Modernization and intensification of agriculture.
Climate Smart Agriculture.
 
Source: Own compilation based on the INDCs reported to COP21.  
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This analysis is dealt with from the sectoral point of view by policies and, secondly, 
from the regional point of view by country and income group. In order to evaluate most 
common policies at world level, it has been calculated the number of countries choosing each 
policy over total countries. Then to address the regional analysis, the same process has been 
made in each income group region. Further information on the method is in the methological 
annex. 
 3.2.1. Analysis by sector and policy 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, the policies that stand out most of all are those aiming for an 
electric mix based on renewable energies (95.2% of the INDCs). This policy is followed by 
transversal efficiency measures for all sectors and the increase in green cover through LULUCF. 
Some of these measures, such as the electrification of the economy and decentralized electricity 
generation (23% and 31% respectively), take on even greater importance on a regional scale. 
With respect to the decentralization of energy, oil rich countries stand out; countries such as 
Nigeria, which aims to install off-grid photovoltaic panels, or Equatorial Guinea , with its 
“home energy” programme. In addition to those already mentioned, an important role will be 
played in the future of energy by natural gas and the combined cycle power stations, according 
to what can be seen from the INDCs. 
Table 3. Top 15 policies. 
 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of INDCs submitted to the COP21. Information provided by total parties with 
policies. 
 
As for the transport subsector, there is a great bid to foster public transport and 
efficiency policies for private vehicles (29.4% and 27.0% of countries, respectively). The latter 
goal the countries hope to achieve through incentive-disincentive tax policies, in particular 
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through the promotion of imports (important in the small island states), or the establishment of a 
carbon tax on inefficient vehicles. Although the commitment to biofuels is not at all generalized 
(18.3% of the plans), it is important demographically and/or economically for some countries 
that are committed to it, such as Argentina , and especially India. Far less important is the 
promotion of the electric or hybrid vehicle (13.5% of countries), although, once more, we find a 
relevant exception in India , which refers to its National Electric Mobility Mission Plan 2020 
(NEMMP) detailing its action plan (Government of India, 2012).    
In the industrial sector, what stand out are the measures to improve efficiency related 
with better technologies and the cogeneration of energy. In addition to reduction measures in 
sectors with especially high emissions, such as that of cement, structural measures are also 
envisaged, such as modernization and increasing the value added of industry and boosting the 
service sector of the economy (China). The use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon 
capture and utilization (CCU) (Saudi Arabia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Malawi, Norway, Qatar, 
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines,  Venezuela), as well as the use of clean technologies, are other 
measures aimed at reducing emissions. Furthermore, countries with an extractive industry do 
not provide for leaving their resources underground. They concern only an improvement in the 
extraction, processing and distribution processes, as well as a reduction in emissions due to gas 
flaring. 
As for the waste sector, classic measures are considered, such as reduction (with a 
smaller presence), recycling and reuse, as well as what is usually called “recovery”. They also 
consider the transformation of waste into energy through biogas or biomass, and the 
improvement of rubbish tips or their construction in countries that lack an adequate waste 
management (26.2% of the INDCs). For its part, India, with an important public health problem 
related with the management of human waste in the cities, aims to promote an ambitious sewage 
network, beginning with the most basic aspect: the installation of lavatories in homes. In the 
agricultural sector, especially in low income countries, the aims of “modernization” abound, 
although they do not specify how this should be done.  Some countries, such as Afghanistan and 
Nigeria among others mention to apply for the so-called Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA), even 
though it is more an adaptation program instead of mitigation. On the other hand, measures are 
also planned to reduce methane emissions in the rice fields, to control the increased use of 
fertilizers and pesticides and, finally, to capture methane from the enteric fermentation of cattle 
and manure.  
Finally, LULUCF sector is one of those that are becoming more important, particularly 
for those countries that already have a large surface area of forest. Of greatest importance in this 
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sphere are: the fight against deforestation, the reforestation of deforested areas, and the 
afforestation of areas previously dedicated to other uses. Outstanding in this respect are such 
countries as Brazil (as a carbon sink) , or others with such large populations as Bangladesh , and 
even those with such enormous economic and environmental importance as China .  
3.2.2. Regional analysis  
 
This sectoral policy view would be incomplete without a regional insight, which has a key 
relevance in the feasibility of accomplishing the Agreement. Figure 1 shows the deviation of 
each top15 policy share by income group from the world average.   
It can be seen, for instance, that the electrification of the economy and its decentralized 
generation take on greater importance in the Less Developed Countries (LDCs). Charcoal is 
used abundantly in these countries as a source of primary energy for heating and cooking (see 
Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Top 15 policies. Differences of each policy with respect to the global 
mean by income groups. 
 
Source: Own elaboration on the basis of INDCs submitted to the COP21. 
This is why low income countries also stand out with respect to improvements in cooking and 
heating efficiency. In the same way, the lower middle income countries are comparatively more 
committed to the reduction, recycling and reuse of waste than the rest, as well as to the fight 
against deforestation. The upper middle income countries are committed above the average to 
promoting biofuels and decentralizing the generation of electricity. On the other hand, the high 
income countries champion the improvement of their public transport systems and the 
efficiency of their industries. Finally, the countries of the OECD, in spite of the bias caused by 
the lack of data, seem to be more committed to natural gas and combined cycle power stations. 
In general terms, it can be seen that low income countries make above average use of the Top 
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15 policies and that this use begins to fall the higher the country’s income. Also evident is a 
dynamic towards abandoning the LULUCF policies as the countries’ incomes get higher.  
These tendencies are confirmed when we analyze the relative weight of each set of sectoral 
policies over the total number of countries. Figure 2 shows the deviation of sectoral relevance 
(measured as the number of countries taking policies from each sector, see methological Annex 
A) of each region from world average. Thus, the LDCs have an above average impact on the 
policies concerning the generation of electricity, housing, waste management, agriculture and 
LULUCF; while the developed countries (DC) do so in transport and the industrial sector. 
Figure 2. Sectoral relevance by income groups. Differences with respect to global 
sectoral mean. 
 
Source: own elaboration on the basis of INDCs submitted to COP21. 
The importance of the abovementioned sectors, in the former case, follows an inverse relation to 
income, while in the second case, the relation is positive. This regional distribution of the 
policies will have important consequences for the efficacy of the Paris Agreement in reaching 
its goals.  
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Table 2. Overview of policies by country (1-72). 
Country
1 Afganisthan G1 G3 G4 R1 I9 W4 A2
2 Albania G I
3 Andorra G W
4 Angola G1 G3 T4 A4 L1 L2
5 Antigua y Barbuda G1 T1 W2
6 Algeria G1 G2 G8 T1 I8 L1 L2
7 Argentina G1 G7 T4 T6 T7 L1
8 Armenia G1 G7 T3 T5 L1 L2
9 Australia G1 G7 T1
10 Azerbaijan G1 G2 G3 G5 G6 R2 R4 T5 T6 T9 I8 I9 W4 A1 A5 L2
11 Bahamas G1 G2 R2 R3 T1 T2 T1
0
12 Bahrain
13 Bangladesh G1 G2 G4 G5 G7 R1 T1 T6 T7 I1 W2 W4 A1 A3 L2
14 Barbados G1 G7 W2
15 Belize G1 G7 R T1 T4 T6 L1 L2
16 Benin G1 G2 G3 R T6 W A1 L1 L2
17 Bhutan G1 G7 T1 T6 T7 T1
0
I1 I5 W1 W4 A2 A5 L1 L2
18 Belarus L2
19 Bolivia G1 G4 L1 L2
20 Bosnia-Ierzegovina G1 G3 G4 R1 R4 I7
21 Botswana
22 Brazil G1 G7 T1 T6 I1 L1 L2
23 Brunei G1 G8 W2
24 Burkina Faso G1 G3 G6 R1 R2 T1 T4 W2 A5 L1 L2
25 Burundi G1 G3 G7 R1 W2 W4
26 Cabo Verde G1 G3 G7 R1 T1 T5 W1 W2 W3 L2
27 Cambodia G1 G3 R T1 T5 T6 I1 A5 L1 L2
28 Cameroon G1 G7 W1 W4 A1 L1
29 Canada G1 G2 T1 T2 I8
30 Chad G1 G5 W4 L2
31 Chile G1 G4 T2 I1
32 China G1 G2 G5 T1 T6 T8 T9 T1
0
I3 I5 I6 I7 W1 W3 A4 A5 L1 L2
33 Colombia
34 Comores G1 G2 G6 W2 W4 L1 L2
35 Congo G1 G4 A1 L1 L2
36 Cook Islands G1 G6 G7
37 Ivory Coast G1 G2 G7 T1 T8 I1 I2 W1 W2 W4 A1 L1
38 Costa Rica G1 G4 G7 G8 R I1 L1 L2
39 Cuba G1 G3 R1 R2 A5
40 Djibouti G1 G6 R T2 T6
41 Dominica G1 G3 G7 T5 W4
42 Ecuador G1 G2 R1 T7 L1 L2
43 Egypt G1 G7 R3 T1 T6 T7 I1 I2 I3 I8 W1 W4 A3 A5
44 El Salvador G1 G7 R3 T8 A1
45 Eritrea G1 G4 R1 R2 T2 T4 I2 W1 W2 A5 L2
46 Ethiopia G1 R T1 I1 A1 L1
47 Fiji G1 G7 T4 T5
48 Phillipines
49 Gabon G1 G2 G7 T2 T6 T9 I8 L1
50 Gambia G1 G6 G7 R1 R3 T1 W1 A3 A4 L2
51 Georgia L1 L2
52 Ghana G1 G7 R1 R2 T6 I1 I2 W1 L1
53 Grenada G1 G7 T2 T3 T4 W2 W4 L1 L2
54 Guatemala
55 Guinea  G1 G4 G7 L1 L2
56 Guinea Bissau G1 L1 L2
57 Equatorial Guinea G1 T1 T6 T8 I1 W1 A2 L1 L2
58 Guyana G1 G3 G7 R1 R2 R4 I2 A5 L1 L2
59 Iaithi
60 Iraq
61 Ionduras
62 India G1 G3 G4 G5 G6 R2 R3 T1 T4 T5 T6 T7 W1 W2 W5 L2
63 Indonesia G1 G7 W1 W4 A1 L1 L2
64 Iran
65 Iceland G1 G2 R I8
66 Marshall Islands G1 G3 G7 R1 T1 T4 T5 W4
67 Israel G1 G2 G7 T6
68 Wamaica G1 G7 T1 T3
69 Wapan G1 G4 R T1 T5 T6 T7 I1 I2 W1 W4 A4 L1 L2
70 Wordan G1 G2 G3 G7 R3 T1 T5 T6 T7 I2 W4 L2
71 Kazakhstan G1 G7 W4 L2
72 Kenya G1 G7 R1 T1 W4 A2 L2
LULUCFEnergy Resid. Transport Industry Waste Agric.
 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of INDCs submitted to the COP21. 
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Table 4 (continuation). Overview of policies by country (73-144).
Country
73 Kiribati G1 G3 T4 L1 L2
74 Kuwait
75 Kyrgizistan
76 Lao G1 G4 T4 T6 T9
77 Lesotho G1 G4 G6 R1 R2 T1 T6 I1 W1 W4 L1 L2
78 Lebanon G1 G7
79 Liberia G1 G4 G7 R1
80 Liechtenstein
81 Macedonia
82 Madagascar G1 G4 G7 R1 W1 W2 A2 A3 L1 L2
83 Malaysia
84 Malawi G1 G3 R1 R3 T4 T6 I4 I7 W1 W2 A1 A4 L1 L2
85 Maldives
86 Mali G1 G4 A2 A3 A4
87 Morocco G1 G2 G7 W1 W4 A1 L2
88 Mauritius G1 G2 G4 T5 W2 A2 L2
89 Mauritania G1 G4 G7 T1 T2
90 Mexico
91 Micronesia
92 Moldova
93 Monaco T5 T6 T1
0
94 Mongolia G1 G5 G6 R1 R3 T2 T5 T6 T9 I1 I2 I4 W1 W2 W4 A4 A5
95 Montenegro
96 Mozambique G1 G2 T4 W1 W4 L1 L2
97 Myanmar G1 G3 G4 G7 R1 L1 L2
98 Namibia G1 R T2 T6 L1
99 Nauru
100 Nepal G1 R1 T6 T1
0
W2 L1 L2
101 Niger G1 G2 G4 R W2 L2
102 Nigeria G1 G2 G3 G7 T2 T6 T7 T9 I1 I8 I9 A2 L1
103 Niue G1 G7 T1 T5 L1
104 Norway G1 I1 I7
105 New Zealand
106 Oman G1 G7 I1 I8
107 Pakistan
108 Palau G1 G3 G4 R T2 T4 T6 W2
109 Papua New Guinea G1 G7 T1 T6 T7 L1 L2
110 Paraguay G1 G7 T7 L2
111 Peru
112 Qatar G1 G7 I1 I7
113 DR Congo G1 G3 A1
114 Central African Republic G1 G4 R1 R2 T4 W1 L1 L2
115 Republic of Korea
116 Dominican Republic
117 Rwanda G1 G2 G3 G6 R1 T2 T4 T6 T7 I1 I3 W2 L1
118 Russia
119 Solomon G1 G3
120 Samoa G1 G3
121 San Marino G1 G8 R3 T8 W4
122 St Kitts G1 G6 G7 G8 T1 T2 T7 T8 T9
123 St Lucia G1 R3 T1 T2 W4 L1
124 Santo Tomé G1 G3
125 Saudi Arabia G1 G7 I7 I8
126 Senegal G1 G3 G4 G7 G2 R1 T6 I4 W2 A3 A5 L1 L2
127 Serbia
128 Seychelles G1 R T2 T4 T5 T6 W4
129 Sierra Leone G1 G3 R4 T1 T6 T4 W1 W2 A2 A5
130 Singapur
131 Somalia G1 L1
132 Sri Lanka T1 W1 W2 W4
133
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines G1 G3 G7 R3 T2 T6 L1 L2
134 South Africa G1 T5 I7
135 Sudan G1 G2 G3 G7 W1 W2 W4 L1 L2
136 South Sudan G1 G7 R T2
137 Switzerland
138 Surinam G1 G3 R T4 W2 L1
139 Swazilandia
140 Thailand G1 G6 G7
141 Tajikistan G1 G6 I5
142 Tanzania G1 G2 G4 G6 R T6 T7
143 Togo G1 R T4 A3 L1
144 Tonga G1 G3 G6 R
LULUCFEnergy Resid. Transport Industry Waste Agric.
Source: Own compilation on the basis of INDCs submitted to the COP21. 
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Table 4 (continuation). Overview of policies by country (145-161). 
Country
145 Trinidad and Tobago
146 Tunez G1 R I4 W2 W5 L2
147 Turkmenistan
148 Turkey G1 G3 G6 R3 T6 T7 T8 I1 W1 W2 W4 A1 A4 L2
149 Tuvalu G1 G3 G7
150 UAE G1 G2 R3 T1 T6 T7 I1 W4
151 Ukraine
152 EU28
153 Uganda G1 G3 G4 R1 T1 A2 A5 L1 L2
154 Uruguay G1 T1 T4 T5 T6 T7 I4 W4 A3 A4 A5 L2
155 USA G1 R3 T1 I8 W4
156 Vanuatu G1 G3 G4 G7 L1
157 Venezuela G1 G3 G7 R2 R3 R4 T6 I4 I7 I8 W4
158 Vietnam G1 G2 G7 R T1 W1 W2 A5 L1 L2
159 Yemen G1 G2 G3 G4 G7 R3 R4 T1 I2 W2 A5
160 Zambia G1 G3 G4 R1 T4 A2 A5 L1
161 Zimbabue G1 G3 G4 G5 G7 R3 T4 W4
LULUCFEnergy Resid. Transport Industry Waste Agric.
 
Source: Own compilation on the basis of INDCs submitted to the COP21. 
3.3. Finance, equity and leadership of the transition 
 
Means of implementation are needed to set these policies in motion. Article 9.1 of the 
Paris Agreement establishes that the DCs (Annex I countries, i.e. OECD) should provide the 
LDCs with financial resources. In addition, there should be reports every two years on the 
resources mobilized. In this sense, the great majority of the INDCs of the LDCs incorporate a 
series of unconditional objectives, assumed by the country itself, and other objectives 
conditioned by the reception of external support. Besides financial resources, other external 
support contemplated in the Agreement includes capacity-building and technology transfer.  
All the figures set out in this section must be considered with caution, due to the lack of 
homogeneity and clarity of the INDCs. Thus, the proportions destined to mitigation policies 
(83.2%), as opposed to those of adaptation, are often biased due to the high figures given by 
India (2500MM$), Iran (927.5MM$) and South Africa (898.79MM$) that account for 79.8% of 
the total funding. The group of countries that make the greatest effort in terms of finance with 
respect to their GDP are the low income countries, due both to their reduced level of GDP and 
the great quantity of external finance they have to account for. Specifically, 87.1%of all the 
financing required by the INDCs over the low income countries which has been evaluated 
corresponds to external resources. The choice, in Table 5, of the last indicator instead of the first 
is due to the fact that it is excessively biased because of the lack of data. It can be observed that 
the majority of countries requiring external financing do so in a relatively high proportion. This 
is such that a conservative estimate (only including the external financing explicitly mentioned) 
shows that almost half (41.4%) of the funding needed to completely implement the INDCs 
depends on international cooperation. Of course, this is a challenge in the design of climate 
funding which we shall deal with below. 
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Table 5. Financial allocation by income group (billions $). Total and effort related 
to GDP 
Mitigation 
(bs $)
% over 
Total
Adaptation 
(bs $)
% over 
Total
Other 
(bs $)
Total 
(bs $)*
% GDP
% external 
support**
Low 387.0 61.8% 156.4 25.0% 82.5 625.8 204.6% 87.1%
Lower Middle 1016.3 35.9% 323.3 11.4% 1492.3 2831.8 99.1% 73.2%
Upper Middle 1793.3 91.5% 167.4 8.5% 0.0 1960.7 69.4% 92.7%
High 6.2 78.6% 1.5 19.4% 0.2 7.9 22.7% 77.8%
High OECD ND ND ND ND ND ND ND ND
Top 12 polluters 846.5 33.6% 222.8 8.8% 1452.3 2521.6 89.2%  -
TOTAL 3202.7 83.2% 648.5 16.8% 1574.9 5426.2 7.3% 41.4%
Source: own compilation on the basis of INDCs submitted to COP21. GDP in 2005 constant dollars at market 
prices.* The totals in bs $ are not always the sum of Mitigation+Adaptation+Other because some INDCs offer totals 
with differences whose origin is not explained.** The percentage represents the proportion of external resources 
required by those INDCs that do offer data. However, the total percentage is the total amount of external resources 
required by all the plans over the total financing of the all the INDCs, including those that have no breakdowns. 
 
In order to channel the public and private resources that finance the mitigation and 
adaptation policies of the DCs to the LDCs, the UNFCCC has developed a complex system of 
climate funding (Buchner et al., 2015; Román, 2013). The ones most cited by the INDCs are the 
Green Climate Fund (GCF), the Green Environment Facility (GEF) and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) for compensation. The CDM should be a zero sum game (Erickson et al., 
2014) in which investment in mitigation projects in the LDCs generates ‘Certified Emission 
Reductions’ (CER) that can be used to increase emissions by the same amount that the 
investment reduced them, or alternatively can be sold on the carbon markets. In total, 42 
countries want to gain access or have already gained access and want to continue with the 
CDM, not counting those who have expressed a desire to use unspecified market mechanisms.  
The funding sources proposed by countries say a lot about the agents who will guide the 
practical set up of the INDCs. Depending on whether the conditional part of the external support 
for the LDCs is larger or smaller, the transition will be influenced by the criteria established by 
the international institutions or by the particular interests of the countries with which they reach 
bilateral agreements. In addition, naturally, the degree of importance given to the public or 
private sector will have consequences in the transition’s directive criteria, its effectiveness, and 
the coordination between policies and how fast the changes are implemented.  
Based on the finance sections of INDCs, it can be seen that in low income countries, 
more importance is given to external support (in particular the GCF), donations, carbon markets 
and the CDM. The weakness of these States means that, in addition, the private sector plays an 
important role. Those outstanding for their confidence in the private sector are Burkina Faso , 
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Liberia  and Sierra Leone . For its heterogeneity of agents, Uganda is also worthy of note, with a 
transition led by the public sector, but with the participation of the local communities, public-
private partnerships (PPP) and the international community.  
In the medium-low income countries, public participation and multilateral finance 
institutions have greater weight. The external support continues to be the principal driving force 
of the transition, although bilateral agreements are gaining weight, while the participation in 
such control mechanisms as CDMs are falling slightly (this is a constant as income rises). While 
Indonesia mainly has confidence in the private sector, Bolivia does so in the public sector and 
demands that the external support should be totally non-returnable. As the countries’ level of 
income rises, the financial autonomy to put the transition into practice also rises. 
In the medium-high income countries, Colombia mainly has confidence in the private 
sector and tries to involve the university system in the transition; while Cuba, on the other hand, 
continues to have confidence in a transition through the public sector, with such measures as the 
distribution of clean technologies for the residential sector (lighting and cooking). China , 
however, deploys some very diverse means led by the state, such as the PPP, favourable 
taxation, public contracts, green credit and financial guidance through the public bank, disaster 
insurance, etc. As we analyze the INDCs of the countries with higher incomes, the information 
becomes scarcer, but it continues with the dynamic of increasing the internal autonomy and 
government leadership.  
3.4. Reducing emissions? 
 
Since one of the objectives of this article is the evaluation of the efficacy of the INDCs 
to comply with the Paris Agreement, the calculation of the variation in absolute emissions for 
each one is fundamental. The said calculations have had to be done because of the disparity in 
the forms of presentation of the contributions and have been carried out according to what is set 
out in the section and annex on methodology. Table 7 shows these results. As explained in 
section 2, there has been needed to estimate emissions reductions from the INDC’s data for 
those not giving the information as a reduction from a base year. Taking the simple arithmetic 
means, and if the mitigation policies (BAU) are not carried out, then each country would double 
(an increase of 95.7%) their emissions of GHGs in 2030 as compared to their defined level 
between 2005-2015. In order to get a better adjusted calculation, if we take the weighted mean 
as each country’s contribution to world emissions (in 2014), the result would be an increase in 
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world emissions of 31.5%. This result can basically be explained by the top 12 polluters, which 
will be analysed separately below.  . 
 
The setting in which mitigation policies are carried out is not much rosier. In the best of 
cases (conditional on the reception of external support from countries not included in Annex I), 
each country would emit an average of 37.8% more than in the years 2005-2015. When this is 
weighted, the figure would be a 19.3% increase, due to the contribution of some Top 12 
polluters, as we discussed in the next subsection.  . In the least optimistic case, in which none of 
the conditional policies are put into practice, each country would modify their emissions on 
average with respect to the base interval by 75.0%. If this is weighted, emissions would increase 
on a global level around 25.8%.  
 
Although the INDCs always talk about reductions, they are seen in GHG emissions 
intensity (CO2eq/GDP) or over a BAU setting. Predicting the countries where the GDP will 
grow much more than their emissions and the BAU settings being on the increase, the final 
result is that of a net increase in GHG emissions, which cancels out the reductions in the Annex 
I countries and Brazil.  India, for instance, aims to more than quadruple their emissions, China 
aims to increase by 39.8%, while other countries such as Burundi , Papua New Guinea , Liberia 
, Bangladesh  or Congo  oscillate around a growth factor of between 3 and 4. The trend 
scenarios of Congo and Burundi stand out especially, as they plan to multiply their emissions by 
more than 6 and 5 times, respectively.  
. 
Figure 3. Emissions variations by income level and different scenarios from 
baseline 2005-2015 to 2030 
 
Own elaboration on the basis of the INDCs submitted to COP21. 
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In effect, Figure 3 reflects a decreasing tendency in mean emissions as income rises. 
However, the weighted mean shows an initially upward trajectory which then decreases as the 
income level increases. This is so because the low income countries currently represent a very 
small fraction of the emissions, while India (lower middle) would explain the highest point. On 
the other hand, the upper middle countries see China’s increase compensated for by the absolute 
reduction in emissions proposed by Brazil. As can be seen, the OECD countries (all of those in 
Annex I) are the only ones that plan to make an absolute reduction in emissions. 
Finally, as can be seen in Table 7, the countries that use their resources less efficiently 
(measured in dollars by percent unit of absolute reduction or over the BAU scenario) are the 
LDCs4. This is due to two reasons. The first one is beacuse they are the countries that plan to 
depend on greater external funding. The second one is because their mitigation policies would 
be more than compensated for by economic growth. 
 
3.5. The Top 12 polluters pathway 
 
Top 12 polluters encompasses 60% of world population and 72.2% of GHG emissions. 
Policies and objectives established by this groups will affect 6 out of 10 world inhabitants (and 
probably increasing as population in China, India and others do not stop rising). Regarding the 
information provided by Top 12 polluters can be seen (Table 6 ) that policies information varies 
amongst them, but financial information is of low quality in general. In the first place of policies 
these countries choose a transition towards a renewable electricity mix.  In the second place in 
most used policies by,  Top 12 polluters arethe improvement in the efficiency of private 
vehicles (77%).  
As a result of the Top 12 policies and emissions reduction objectives, the whole Paris 
Agreement expected outcomes vary. In fact, when the average emissions reduction objectives 
are weighted by the countries contribution to GHG world emissions, the result is lower. This is 
because the increases in China and India (39.8% and 232.78%) respectively) are offseted by the 
reduction compulsorily proposed by Annex I countries plus Brazil.  Nevertheless, if just China 
and India are taken apart, Paris Agreement expected outcomes would be rather differents. For 
instance, without their contribution, the emissions would decrease by 4.0% in the Conditional 
                                                     
4- The high index shown by the upper middle countries is due to the high inefficiency in reducing 
emissions of the funding used by Iran (77.3MM$ per percent unit of reduction over the BAU scenario).  
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scenario, while they would slighlt rise by 2.5% unconditionally. In other words, given the past 
behaviour of DCs economies, the incorporation of China and India to their consumption and 
production patterns would be the main reason why the Paris Agreement objectives are so 
difficult to achieve. Paradoxically, without the economic contribution of India (as China does 
not provide finance information) the allocation or resources destined to mitigation would be 
almost halved in terms of world GDP, droping to 3.9%. 
Table 6. Overview of Top12 polluters. Information, emissions and financial 
resources. 
General 
Information 
quality
Financial 
Information 
quality
Main policies*
Share of 
total 
emissions
BAU Unc Cond
China High Low - 39.8% - G1, G2, G5, T1, T6, T8, T10, I3, I5, I6, I7, W1, W3, A4, 
A5, L1, L2
23.9%
U.S.A. Low Low - -28.0% - G1, R3, T1, I8, W4 12.1%
EU-28 Low Low - -34.8% - No information. 9.0%
India Medium Medium - 232.8% - G1, G3, G5, G6, R2, R3, T1, T4, T5, T6, T7, W1, W2, 
W5, L2
5.7%
Brazil Medium Low - -43.0% - G1, G7, T1, T6, I1, L1, L2 5.7%
Russian Fed. Low Low - 10.3% - No information. 5.3%
Japan High Low - -22.7% - G1, G4, R, T1, T5, T6, T7, I1, I2, W1, W4, A4, L1, L2 2.8%
Canada Low Low 35.0% -30.0% No information. 2.0%
Congo, DR Medium Medium 74.0% 74.0% 44.4% G1, G3, A1 1.5%
Indonesia Medium Low 123.7% 65.6% 32.0% G1, G7, W1, W4, A1, L1, L2 1.5%
Australia Low Low - -28.0% - G1, G7, T1 1.5%
Korean Rep. Medium Low 51.9% -4.3% - No information. 1.3%
Total 71.2% 26.3% 10.5% 72.2%
Weighted 24.5% 20.5% 19.2%
Absolute emissions 
variation respect 2005 
(%)
Own elaboration on the basis of the INDCs analyzed (INDCs,2016). *According to the code stated in Table 2. 
 
 
4. Economic and environmental features of INDCs 
 
In order to globally evaluate the INDCs, we follow the definition of Fischer-Kowalski  
(2011) of a socio-metabolic transition towards sustainability as that in which society does not 
pass the limits imposed by the biophysical system upon which it depends. To do this, it is not 
enough to analyze the sufficiency or insufficiency of the reduction in GHG emissions to the 
atmosphere. It is also necessary to evaluate the energy and material sustainability of the 
suggested policies to promote a socio-economic structure. Section 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 contrasts 
policies collected in the INDCs (see section 3.2) with the literature. Supported in this literature, 
we discuss the feasibility of INDCs proposed policies and its capability to jointly achieve the 
2ºC objective. Section 4.5 and 4.6 follow the same rationale but referring to finance (see section 
3.3) and emissions reduction (see section 3.4) respectively rather than policies. The variables 
through which the INDCs are classified are as follows: i/ socio-economic impact of the 
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transition; ii/ focus on energy management; iii/ substitution of non-renewable sources; iv/ the 
role of technology; v/ equality of the transition; vi/ degree of compliance with emission 
reductions.  
4.1. Socio-economic impact  
 
Although the Director of Strategies of the UNFCCC has admitted that the fight against 
climate change requires a “fundamental transformation in the way we use and produce energy” 
(Thorgeirsson, 2015), there is a generalized belief that this is consistent with maintaining the 
current socio-economic system (Spash, 2016).  
Although numerous INDCs, such as China, appeal to economic growth and the 
modernization of their productive structure as a mitigation strategy, there is abundant empirical 
evidence of the string correlation between growth and environmental impact (de Bruyn et al., 
1998; Stern, 2004; Tapia-Granados & Carpintero, 2013; Tapia-Granados, et al., 2012; Wagner, 
2008; Carpintero, 2005). Far from there being a process of dematerialization associated with 
economic growth (Shafik, 1994)5, what has been observed is a process of environmental load 
displacement (Peng et al., 2016; Muradian et al., 2002; Cole, 2004). The transfer of “dirty” 
production to the poor regions has been facilitated by productive specialization, commerce and 
international finance (Batra et al., 1998; Andersson & Lindroth, 2001; Steen-Olsen, et al., 
2012). In addition, we know that both technological industry (Sun-Hee, 2002) and, in general, 
industrial modernization and the switch to a tertiary economy (Carpintero, 2003) are great 
consumers of both energy and materials.  
On the other hand, numerous INDCs, of note among them being Bangladesh, 
Cameroon, Turkey or Morocco, express their interest in modernizing their agricultural systems, 
although they do not explain how this might mitigate the emissions of GHG. However, history 
tells us that agricultural modernization turns into a process of subordination to industry, making 
the former dependent on the latter and closely linked to oil products6. Thus, agriculture 
modernization would only result in an increase in both direct and indirect emissions. The 
indirect emissions are not usually assigned to agriculture, which are normally reduced to 
                                                     
5- As established by the Environmental Kuznets Curve. 
6 - Related with its use in making pesticides and herbicides, fuel for machines and that associated with the 
transport needed to carry the food from where it is produced to where it is consumed (a distance that this process 
increases). 
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methane from livestock and the directly emitted waste. This way, the contribution of modern 
agriculture to climate change is often undervalued. 
For all the above reasons, the link between economic growth and wellbeingandalso 
between growth and environmental sustainability is weakening, as an abundant literature on 
ecological economics has long been stressing (Víctor, 2015; Jackson, 2011). Measures from 
industrial ecology approach, followed by Rwanda among others, would contribute in a more 
effective way to reduce environmental impacts (Ivner et al., 2015; Wen and Meng, 2015; Yu et 
al., 2015; Côte and Liu, 2016). Given the environmental costs of modern agriculture, it would 
be much more interesting to transit towards agroecology, with a similar performance for modern 
agriculture but with less dependence on petroleum and environmental impacts (Altieri, 1995; 
Gliessman, 2006; Badgley, 2007; Pretty et al., 2003; Seufert, 2012). This model would be based 
on a proximity system of agricultural foodstuffs that would reduce the need for transport as well 
as a less meat intensive diet. Bhutan, for instance, advocates encouraging organic farming. 
China, on the other hand, advocates measures aimed at encouraging an agricultural system that 
adequately closes the ecological cycles, as well as reaching “zero growth” in pesticides and 
herbicides (intensive in petroleum use).  
4.2. Demand side management policies 
 
With the exception of a few countries, such as Algeria, Barbados, Bhutan or Costa Rica 
, the majority of the INDCs assume there will be a growing demand for energy, i.e, energy 
demand is considered as an exogenous variable. Instead of proposing ways to reduce energy 
demand, beyond the general compromise with efficiency gains, the INDCs focus on changing 
the energy mix. -However, this view would seem to ignore the energy resources we have 
counted on in the past and which can be counted on in the future. The development and growth 
of industrial society cannot be understood without the concurrence of fossil fuels and their 
enormous energy potential(Hall 2011; Fouquet 2016). There are, therefore, at least two factors 
that seriously compromise this basic assumption of the great majority of INDCs and 
government sources studied.  
First of all, the arrival of the conventional peak oil (Hubbert, 1956; ASPO, 2008, IEA, 2010) 
has opened the door for non-conventional oil with a much lower energy performance (EROEI7) 
(Hall & Klitgaard, 2012), which are also more expensive and contaminating to extract 
                                                     
7 - Energy returned on energy invested (EROEI) is the mean energy performance as the relation between 
the amount of energy obtained by each unit of energy invested in a process. 
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(Heinberg, 2013). This, together with the foreseeable arrival of extraction peaks in other vitally 
important energy sources (Heinberg, 2007), leads us to anticipate risks for the future energy 
supply. Moreover, the International Energy Agency (IEA) (2016) recognized that it is not 
assured that investments in new oil explorations will be enough to meet demand due to high 
decline in output from existing fields. Secondly, if the transitions towards low-carbon 
economies of the INDCs are to be taken seriously, leaving a high proportion of fossil fuels 
underground should be mandatory (McGlade & Perkins, 2015).  The substitution of the energy 
they provide (to say nothing of whether such provision will get larger or not) by other sources 
free from GHGs would seem to be complicated, if not accompanied by a reduction in energy 
consumption, as we shall see below.  
The main hurdle to follow this path is that it implies changing consumption and production 
patterns by means of demand side management policies (Creutzig et al. 2016), especially in 
DCs and emergent countries. Nevertheless, these policies applied to agriculture, transport, 
buildings and other sectors show interesting results for climate change mitigation (Creutzig et 
al. 2016). For instance, households’ food consumption has high impacts on energy consumption 
and direct and indirect emissions (Di Donato, Lomas, and Carpintero 2015). Therefore,  changes 
in diets would be able to reduce by 35% GHG emissions (Stehfest et al. 2009), but  it would 
require a huge conversion in agro-alimentary sector. In addition, reduction of transport needs 
would require re-organizing the cities design once all of their infrastructures are yet installed. 
Finally, this reduction in transport needs could need shorter commercialization channels and 
reducing the volume of international trade.  
4.3. Substitution of non-renewable energies 
 
On applying a management approach to the energy supply, the INDCs only consider a 
substitution of the current energy mix by another one with a greater renewable and/or nuclear 
proportion. Nevertheless, the ability to substitute one technology for another is far from being 
perfect.  
The support or maintenance of nuclear energy is subject to limitations as far as 
resources goes, and this should be taken into account. If the forecast of the IEA turns out to be 
true, the extraction peak of uranium may well be reached in the next few decades (Zittel & 
Schindler, 2006). On the other hand, the substitution by biomass (in particular biofuels) is also 
subject to strong limitations (de Castro et al., 2014; Pimentel et al., 2007; Patzek, 2004). Due to 
the strong dependence of modern agriculture on fossil fuels, agrofuels present a very poor 
Comentario [O1]: Añadir breve 
mención a gestión demanda yu 
refeeremncia Creutzig 2016. 
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EROEI (de Castro et al., 2014). Furthermore, their cultivation enters into competition with land 
dedicated to food production, upon which it would exercise such pressure as to possibly result 
in price rises.  
In addition, the electrification of the economy, even if it could be done totally through 
renewable sources, would not be simple at all. In this sense, there are sound arguments to 
sustain that renewable sources do not have sufficient capacity to replace the energy potential of 
fossil fuels (Moriarty and Honnery, 2016; Capellán-Pérez et al., 2014; 2015; de Castro et al., 
2011; 2013; Hoogwijk et al., 2004). There are also rigidities in the substitution of sources due to 
the different uses they have. For instance, the fuel used in planes, transport and heavy industry 
cannot simply be substituted by electric energy. In spite of some meritorious efforts in this 
sense, it would seem clear that it is very difficult to consider a simple technological exchange in 
the energy mix if it is not accompanied by a reduction in energy consumption. 
Finally, it is worth to mention that in absence of a clear policy of leaving fossil fuels 
underground (McGlade & Ekins, 2015), the international community could face the green 
paradox. As the market penetration of non-fossil sources increases, their demand would fall, 
leading to decrease of prices. If there is no political decision to leave fossil fuels underground, 
their consumption will probably be rebooted via prices incentives. So, if these circumstances are 
to be avoided, changing the energy mix through is not enough to address decarbonisation.  
 
4.4. The role of technology 
 
The transition towards a hypocarbon model is already possible today, but it would 
involve a great socio-economic transformation, as stated before. Therefore, technological 
solutions are proposed, prominently, those referred to efficiency. These policies are the ones 
that have captured the most funding in recent years8 (Buchner et al., 2015) and are the preferred 
policies of the INDCs. Although they are destined to reducing energy consumption, the rebound 
effect (Polimeni et al., 2008; Blake, 2005; Carpintero, 2003; Duarte et al., 2013) may 
paradoxically cause the opposite effect, since the most efficient technology reduces the price 
and increases consumption beyond the initial reduction.  
                                                     
8- In its less conservative range (HSBC, 2014). 
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A reflection of this point of view would be carbon capture and storage (CCS) or 
afforestation, which would allow the economy system to keep emitting GHGs into the 
atmosphere. For instance, Saudi Arabia, one of the main world oil producers, focus on capturing 
CO2 from their fields rather than leaving the fossil fuel underground and diversify its economy. 
The first of them has shown it can face up to obstacles that are difficult to overcome in order to 
be economically viable (Raveendran, 2013; Leung et al., 2014). On the other hand, afforestation 
is another of the most widely used measures among the INDCs, especially in LDCs. However, 
as the forestry land competes with agriculture land, a strong increase in forested areas could 
push up the prices of prime materials for food and biofuels. In the best of cases, the afforestation 
of the most ambitious countries could offset deforestation to other countries in order to meet the 
farmland global requirements (Nilsson et al., 1995; Alig et al., 1997; Murray et al., 2004; Ewers 
and Rodrigues, 2008; González-Eguino et al., 2016). It is, therefore, a policy that could be 
incompatible with the current agro-alimentary model and the promotion of biofuels, or maybe 
subject to filtrations that would convert afforestation into a neutral climate policy. 
Although it is a critical sector, the transition towards sustainable transport is of 
secondary importance in the INDCs (Capellán-Pérez et al., 2014) and there are serious 
difficulties when attempting to carry it out. As mentioned above, it would be extremely difficult 
to supply a growing fleet of private vehicles by substituting fossil fuels for electricity or 
biofuels. In addition, their deployment would enter into conflict with the availability of such 
materials as lithium (Ortego et al., 2016) and require strong institutional support for the creation 
of niches in the market and infrastructures. This means that the process could take decades to 
complete (Kemp et al., 1998; Fouquet, 2010). In any case, transport electrification is not even a 
very demanded policy in INDCs, as just 13.5% chooses it. Rather, hybrid and more efficient 
vehicles is the most demanded transport policy amongst the INDCs. 
4.5. Transition equity 
 
Emergent medium income countries, such as China or India, interpret equity in the 
transition as an excuse to maintain the growth of their emissions. The return to individual, 
voluntary contributions agreed on in the Paris Agreement has only further contributed to 
sustaining this point of view. However, the obligatory nature of the transfer of resources from 
the DCs to the LDCs has led to the consideration of the INDCs of the DCs as adequate in terms 
of equity on an individual level. Nevertheless, the global view indicates a different reality, since 
the lack of a globally integrated agreement makes it ineffective. The measures that delve into 
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the need to redistribute the effort are reduced to the international climate funding institutions 
that work through individual projects and to bilateral agreements between DCs and the rest. 
The commitment achieved in the Copenhagen Agreement (renewed in Paris) to 
mobilize 100MM $ annually from the DCs to the LDCs has not only not been kept until now, 
but falls far short of the needs detected in the INDCs by the LDCs. The total external support 
distributed between 2020 and 2030 results in the need of 160 MM$ annually. Conversely, the 
IEA (2014) estimates that achieving a low-carbon energy sector will require an average of 1.2 
trillion $ in additional investments every year until 2050. However, the INDCs just compromise 
286.45MM $ annually from the total accredited investment. The comparison highlights the fact 
that, in the best of cases, the financial information of the INDCs is extremely deficient and that, 
if taken as an approximation, the Paris Agreement would be inefficient in achieving its means of 
implementation.  
According to the Landscape of Climate Change (Buchner, 2015), the climate and 
development institutions only provided 26% of the funding, of which half was national, so only 
13% came from bilateral and multilateral institutions. Furthermore, 74% of all climate 
investment (both public and private) remained in the country of origin, reaching 94% in the case 
of private funding. This shows that private funding tends not to have an important role in the 
equity of the transit. Similarly, by its very nature, and in the absence of adequate incentives, 
private funding is subject to the rhythms and needs of the enterprises, which has proven to be 
ineffective in the fight against climate change (Atteridge, 2011).  However, the weight of 
private funding in climate policies has been constantly increasing, from 56% of the total in 2011 
to 62% in 2015 (Buchner et al., 2011; Buchner et al., 2015). In the light of all this, it would not 
seem to be a good trend for promoting equity, efficiency and multilateralism. 
The most important incentives instrument in climate funding is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), which is widely incorporated into the INDCs. The CDM, as described 
previously, which is theoretically neutral in so far as emissions reductions is concerned, could 
be contributing to their increase. This would be because of problems in determining 
additionality or the incorrect limitation in the number of years projects can last (Erickson et al., 
2014). Funding through projects is, indeed, one of the main lagoons in a global climate policy, 
since the climate finance institutions (GCF, GEF, etc.) finance projects and do not obey an 
equitable global transit strategy that can effectively reduce emissions. 
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4.6. Compliance with the objectives of emissions reductions 
 
As the Non-Annex 1 countries are allowed to present their mitigation objectives on a 
trend scenario, the Paris Agreement ends up causing substantial increases, on a global scale, of 
GHG emissions. In addition, these figures are obtained on the basis of several conservative 
suppositions. Thus, it is considered that the reductions of the Annex 1 countries will be 
complied with and are also accounted for as BAU scenarios. In those INDCs that offer a 
reduction interval, they have opted for the upper bound; while, in the “Conditional” scenario, 
they assume that all the external funding is received. These increases in annual emissions, much 
higher than the planet’s impact absorption capacity, would go against the principal objective of 
the Paris Agreement: not surpassing the 2oC above preindustrial levels.  
Supposing that the proportion each country contributes to world emissions does not 
vary too much, if we take the weighted mean in each scenario, while maintaining the level 
reached between 2030 and 2050 constant, then the world temperature would increase by at least 
3oC (IPCC, 2014). Even the IEA (2016) assumes increasing emissions in all their scenarios. 
Should annual emissions continue to increase in the same proportion, a rise of 4oC would be 
practically guaranteed. This increase would endanger humanity’s essential food production and 
would irreversibly worsen the problems related to extreme meteorological phenomena (IPCC, 
2014). Thus, we will probably see a transfer of resources from mitigation and the regular 
economic activities to the defensive efforts of adaptation. 
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Table 7. Overview of main results (excluding policies). 
 
Own elaboration. 
* The percentage represents the proportion of external resources required by those INDCs that do offer data. However, the total percentage is the total amount of external resources required by 
all the plans over the total financing of the all the INDCs, including those that have no breakdowns 
** Share of global emissions (2012) according to EDGAR. The sum of all country groups does not account for 100% because of discarded INDCs and non-participant countries in COP. 
*** Top 12 polluter emissions variation are for base year 2005. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The Paris Agreement sets up a landscape in which the interventions of the agents that 
bring about the transition will be carried out. In spite of the heterogeneity in the documentation 
of the INDCs, this paper proposes a classification of the characteristics of the commitments of 
each country. This classification and its results (summarised in Table 7) allows analyzing the 
different patterns of national proposals and analyzing the real effectiveness of the proposed 
measures. 
Although policies at global level show certain patterns (renewable electricity mix, 
efficiency, afforestation, etc.) regional distribution matters. The non-integrated, individual, 
voluntary approach of the Paris Agreement, under a free trade and capital flows framework, 
could lead policies in one region to be offset by the dynamic response in other regions. 
Responsibility of climate change falls on Developed Countries (DCs) and their consumption 
and production patterns. However, the incorporation of China and India to these patterns, 
sometimes in order to satisfy DCs demand through environmental load displacement, hinders 
the accomplishment of Paris Agreement even more. As long as the socioeconomic system 
remains unchanged, the objective of the Paris Agreement would have to face numerous 
challenges like these. 
Another difficulty facing the full compliance of the INDCs is the voluntary nature of 
their commitment and the non-existence of any control, monitoring and penalization system. In 
addition, the low quality and scarce clarity of information provided concerning these individual 
commitments (only 18.5% provide good information on policies and emissions and 12.7% on 
finance) contributes to worsening difficulties for any kind of follow-up. What is more, the 
“Conditional” compliance of the INDCs is subject to the receipt, on the part of the LDCs, of 
external funding that represents 41.4% of the total funding. Not only this, but the channelling of 
this funding (external and internal) through a model based on individual projects, carbon 
markets (through the CDM) and their growing dependence on private initiative, make for an 
uncertain future panorama. Ultimately, after burying the Kyoto Protocol and the questionable 
results from the Copenhagen Agreement (2009), the renunciation of an integrated, global model 
in the Paris Agreement seems to lead to expected results that will be weak. In addition, 
geographical, instutional and biophysical constraints matter, dynamically adjusting the 
consequences of policies submitted. Further climate agreements should take this into 
consideration in order to achieve effective results. 
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Thus, from the detailed review of the INDCs, it can be concluded that, in the best of 
cases, annual world emissions would increase by around 19.3% in 2030 with respect to the base 
interval (2005-2015). Even so, this supposes a reduction in comparison with the 31.5% increase 
projected by the BAU scenario in which no measures are taken. Should this level remain 
constant between 2030 and 2050, the world temperature would increase by at least 3oC (IPCC, 
2014). Should annual emissions continue to increase in the same proportion, an increase of 4ºC 
would practically be assured. Adaptation of natural and economic systems to climate change 
will thus have to be addressed in the near future. 
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Annex A. Methodological annex.  
 
The heterogeneity of the data in the INDCs has forced us to make a series of hypotheses 
which are summarized in the Methodology section and are set out in detail here.  
The policies, classified using codes, have been recorded country by country, grouped in 
the sectors described above. To carry out the analysis, and to establish comparisons, the 
proportion of countries adopting each policy over the total number of countries providing 
information has been calculated. This reduces the analysis to 126 of the 161 INDCs submitted 
(representing 188 countries). In order to estimate the interest of each group of countries by 
income, we have calculated the mean of these proportions in each sector. 
As for funding, we have collected the data offered in the INDCs in dollars. Although the 
base varies in some of them, in most of them there is no mention of this aspect, so the quantities 
expressed in dollars are subject to this limitation. To calculate the percentage of external support 
required by the INDCs that do not explicitly provide this information, we have assumed that it 
would be distributed uniformly, the proportion being that which represents the conditional 
reduction in emissions over the total reduction in emissions (conditional + unconditional).  
We have calculated the variation in emissions of the INDCs in relation to the intensity 
of emissions in the following manner: having defined the intensity of emissions as 
A.1.    𝐼 = 𝐸
𝐺𝐺𝐺
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the following equation is solved:  
A.2.    ((𝐼2030∗𝐺𝐺𝐺2030)−(𝐼𝐵𝐵∗𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵))(𝐼𝐵𝐵∗𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵) − 100 = ∆𝐸.   
Where I2030/BY is the intensity of emissions in 2030 and the base year respectively; 𝐺𝐺𝐺2030/𝐵𝐵 
is the GDP in 2030 and the base year respectively; and ∆𝐸 is the percentage variation of the 
emissions. Both China and India present their data in this way and require additional 
hypotheses. They have had to use the projections of the GDP for the year 2030 of the OECD. 
In the case of the INDCs that apply a reduction on a BAU scenario, the procedure was 
as follows: applying arbitrary emissions of 100, the problem was solved using the following 
equation: 
A.3    (�100∗(1+∆𝐵𝐵𝐵)∗(1−∆𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺)�−100)
100
= ∆𝐸.  
Where ∆𝐵𝐵𝐵  is the percentage variation of emissions in the BAU scenario; ∆𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐺 is 
the proposed percentage reduction in emissions on the BAU scenario (conditional and 
unconditional, depending on the case); and ∆𝐸 is the percentage variation in the emissions. 
BAU scenario refers to the emissions in the horizon year if policies were not applied, 
usually based on historical emissions trends.  
With a conservative assumption, we have considered that the INDCs which propose a 
reduction range will finally achieve the upper bound.  
Regarding the policies analysis, we have to differentiate three analyses: policies at 
world level, policies at regional level, and sectoral-regional analysis.  
Policies at world level are assessed throughout the number of countries using each 
policy over total countries, according to eq. A4: 
A4.  𝛼𝑊 = ∑𝐺𝑖𝑁   
Being subscript i each policy, regardless the sector and ∑𝐺𝑖 the number of countries 
using each policy (𝐺𝑖𝑖 ) considered and N the total number of countries. Top 15 policies are 
shown in Table 4. For the regional level, an analogous calculation is made: 
A5.  𝛼𝑟 = ∑𝐺𝑖,𝑟𝑁𝑟  
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Where the numerator represents the same as in A4 but for region (income group) r. The 
denominator is the number of countries in region r. Figure 1 shows the deviation from each top 
15 policy share by income group to the world average, namely:  𝛼𝑟 −  𝛼𝑊. Finally, we take the 
arithmetical mean of  𝛼𝑟 and 𝛼𝑊 by sector: 
A6. 𝛼𝑖,𝑊 =  ∑𝛼𝑊𝑁𝑗  ;  𝛼𝑖,𝑟 =  ∑𝛼𝑟𝑁𝑗    
With 𝑁𝑖 being the number of policies in each sector j. By proceeding this way, we 
obtain an approximation to the relative importance of each sector in the different regions and in 
the world. Finally, analogously to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows the deviation from each region to 
world: 𝛼𝑖,𝑟 − 𝛼𝑖,𝑊.  
Annex B. Countries by income group 
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